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CVE-2026-90269NVD

Vulnerability Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Reject load-acquire from pointers requiring fault protection

A BPF_LOAD_ACQ is not rewritten to a BPF_PROBE_MEM load by the verifier,
unlike a regular BPF_LDX, so the JIT emits a plain load with no exception
table entry and a fault panics the kernel instead of being handled.

Reject the source pointer types that a BPF_LDX would have had that fault
protection applied to, i.e. the ones bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() turns
into BPF_PROBE_MEM: a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED,
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY |
PTR_UNTRUSTED.

This is reachable e.g. by loading ->mm out of a trusted task_struct
yields an untrusted pointer to mm_struct, and it is NULL for a kernel
thread:

[...]
SEC("tp_btf/sched_switch")
int BPF_PROG(demo, bool preempt, struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = next->mm; /* untrusted */

out_ldx = (__u64)mm->pgd; /* BPF_LDX */
out_acq = load_acquire(&mm->pgd); /* BPF_LOAD_ACQ */
return 0;
}
[...]

Both dereference the same pointer, but only the BPF_LDX is protected
(x86-64 JIT, jump targets shown prog-relative):

[...]
; out_ldx = (__u64)mm->pgd;
17: movq $-10485760, %r10
1e: movq %rsi, %r11
21: addq $184, %r11
28: subq %r10, %r11
2b: movabsq $140737498841088, %r10
35: cmpq %r10, %r11
38: ja 0x3e <-- kernel addr?
3a: xorl %edi, %edi <-- no: dst = 0, skip the load
3c: jmp 0x45
3e: movq 184(%rsi), %rdi <-- yes: load + extable entry
[...]
; load_acquire(&mm->pgd)
53: movq %rsi, %rdi
56: movq 184(%rdi), %rax <-- no check, no extable entry
[...]

Note that BPF_PROBE_MEM is not visible in a bpftool xlated dump, as
bpf_insn_prepare_dump() rewrites it back to BPF_MEM.

A PTR_TRUSTED pointer is deliberately not on the list. Such a load is
not converted either, but it does not need to be, since the pointer is
guaranteed live, so load-acquire from it stays allowed.

The check is gated on BPF_LOAD_ACQ so that atomic RMW and store-release
error messages are unchanged; writes (RMW / store-release) to such
pointers are already rejected elsewhere, so only load-acquire needs this.
Severity Level
UNKNOWN
Published Date
Sep 17, 2026
Last Modified
Sep 17, 2026
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation yet
EPSS Score (30-Day)
0.20%Probability
Root Weakness (CWE)
N/A

Affected & Patched Versions

Affected Versions
  • Linux Linux >= 880442305a3908589bf4d6fc1d79edb577ee497c and < c4c8de3bf48d3756ab0f910fe5cc4937d70efdcd
  • Linux Linux >= 880442305a3908589bf4d6fc1d79edb577ee497c and < 5f8ade6e9b7931fc9697394f1b2c4ae833f5ac18
  • Linux Linux >= 880442305a3908589bf4d6fc1d79edb577ee497c and < 7db0a00445f1a40bacfe9b747405c11cb5f10fc9
  • Linux Linux >= 6.15
Patched Versions
  • Linux Linux c4c8de3bf48d3756ab0f910fe5cc4937d70efdcd
  • Linux Linux 5f8ade6e9b7931fc9697394f1b2c4ae833f5ac18
  • Linux Linux 7db0a00445f1a40bacfe9b747405c11cb5f10fc9
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