CVE Watchtower

← Back to CVE List

CVE-2026-41508NVD

Vulnerability Summary

## Root Cause

File: `internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go` (since commit `3347961b`, PR #1453 *"feat: ignore unexpected EOF in MIME multipart request body processor"*, merged 2026-03-06, first shipped in `v3.4.0`).

The multipart body processor treats `io.ErrUnexpectedEOF` as a benign condition. Three sites are affected; all mishandle the error the same way.

### File branch, filesystem-backed (lines 71–77)

```go
sz, err := io.Copy(temp, p)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1")
return err
}
seenUnexpectedEOF = true // <-- flag never set for UnexpectedEOF
}
```

### File branch, TinyGo path (lines 82–88)

```go
sz, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, p)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1")
return err
}
seenUnexpectedEOF = true // <-- same gap
}
```

### Field branch (lines 102–113)

```go
data, err := io.ReadAll(p)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1")
return err
}
}
...
if errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
break // <-- exits loop with no flag set
}
```

The function then returns `nil` at line 116 for any body that ended prematurely. Consequences:

1. `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR` stays at its initial value `0`.
2. `REQBODY_ERROR` is not propagated either (since `ProcessRequest` returns `nil`).
3. Neither of the two canonical defensive rules shipped in `coraza.conf-recommended` fires:
```conf
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:200002,phase:2,deny,status:400,..."
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:200003,phase:2,deny,status:400,..."
```

All other error branches in the same function (lines 27, 48, 66, 84, 104) correctly set `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR` before returning; this is an inconsistency introduced in #1453, not a systemic issue.

## Context — why the error is swallowed

PR #1453 was introduced to support `SecRequestBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial`: when a body is cut off because it hit the configured request-body limit, the parser should still surface the parts it did receive. The PR legitimately needs to avoid `return err` on `ErrUnexpectedEOF`. But it also silenced the strict-error flag, which is the wrong compromise — the flag is exactly how operators observe that something was incomplete. The fix should keep the non-fatal `break` and still set `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR`, letting the operator decide (via rule 200003 or their own policy) whether partial processing is acceptable.

## Impact

Rule 200003 is Coraza's blanket defense against **multipart parser-inconsistency evasions** — attack classes where the body is crafted so Coraza's Go `mime/multipart` reader and the backend's multipart parser (PHP, Node, Java, legacy libmodsecurity, etc.) disagree about where fields start or end. The rule fails-closed on *any* malformed body, so the operator does not need to enumerate every parser-disagreement trick. That defense is now void for any evasion that also truncates the body.

Examples of what becomes reachable:

- Smuggling a second field past the truncation boundary that the backend's more permissive parser still extracts.
- Hiding payload bytes after a deliberately malformed `Content-Disposition` header that the Go parser refuses but the backend accepts.
- Generic CRS evasion chains that depend on rule 200003 as a catch-all.

The fix is tiny and low-risk. The impact is disproportionately large because rule 200003 is the *only* defense-in-depth rule for multipart in the recommended config — there is no secondary signal.

## Proof of Concept

Start a Coraza-wrapped HTTP server shipping the canonical defensive rules from `coraza.conf-recommended`:

```conf
SecRuleEngine On
SecRequestBodyAccess On
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:200002,phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.'"
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:200003,phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Multipart strict validation failed.'"
```

Three real-curl requests against the listener:

| # | Body | Expected (with rule 200003) | Observed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Well-formed `field1=benign` + closing boundary | HTTP 200 | HTTP 200 (baseline) |
| 2 | Two parts, **no closing boundary** (`...MALFORMED_NO_TRAILING_BOUNDARY`) | HTTP 400 | **HTTP 200** |
| 3 | Mid-part cutoff: `name="x"\r\n\r\nabc` (no `\r\n`, no boundary) | HTTP 400 | **HTTP 200** |

Server-side match log is empty for cases 2 and 3: neither rule 200002 nor rule 200003 fires. Example (case 2):

```
--PoCBoundary12345\r\n
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="field1"\r\n\r\n
benign\r\n
--PoCBoundary12345\r\n
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="truncated"\r\n\r\n
MALFORMED_NO_TRAILING_BOUNDARY
```
→ `HTTP 200`, no audit record, transaction.variables.multipartStrictError == 0.

## Mitigation

A two-line change per site in `internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go`:

```go
if errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1")
seenUnexpectedEOF = true // keep existing break semantics
}
```

Apply at the three sites (lines 71–77, 82–88, 102–113 in the current code). No change to the `return err` control flow is needed — the fix only adds the flag-setter alongside the existing `seenUnexpectedEOF = true` / `break` path. PR #1453's ProcessPartial goal is preserved.

Operators running in `ProcessPartial` mode who intentionally allow truncated bodies should pair this with a config-level change (downgrade rule 200003 to detection-only, or scope it with a secondary check on whether `SecRequestBodyLimit` was actually hit). The engine change above is safe by default — it restores the invariant that malformed multipart always raises `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR`.

## Affected versions

Introduced in PR #1453 (commit `3347961b`, merged 2026-03-06). First released in `v3.4.0` and still present on `main` at `599ae64a`.

Affected: `>= 3.4.0, <= 3.7.0`.

Releases prior to `v3.4.0` returned `err` on `io.ErrUnexpectedEOF` and so `REQBODY_ERROR` would propagate via rule 200002 even if `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR` was not set — a different (arguably stricter) behavior that did not exhibit this bypass.

## References

- `internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go` lines 70–113
- `coraza.conf-recommended` rule `id:200003` (`MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR`)
- PR #1453 — introduction of `ErrUnexpectedEOF` swallowing
- `coraza.conf-recommended` rule `id:200002` (`REQBODY_ERROR`) — also not raised because `ProcessRequest` returns `nil`
Severity Level
MEDIUM(5.8)
Published Date
Oct 6, 2026
Last Modified
Oct 6, 2026
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation yet
CVE Record Status
Reserved
This CVE ID is referenced in a public advisory, but the CVE Program has not published its official CVE Record yet. Full CVSS/CPE data from NVD will appear here once it does.
EPSS Score (30-Day)
Data Pending
Root Weakness (CWE)
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required.
Refer to the official MITRE database for detailed architectural specifications regarding this weakness.
Refer to the official MITRE database for detailed architectural specifications regarding this weakness.
CVSS v3.1 Base Metrics — Score 5.8
Attack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
ScopeChanged
ConfidentialityNone
IntegrityLow
AvailabilityNone

Affected & Patched Versions

Affected Versions
  • github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 >= 3.4.0, <= 3.7.0
Patched Versions
Not provided by Private for this CVE.
🎁7-Day Free Trial — Try Pro or Team, no card required.
📧Email Delivery — Threat intel straight to your inbox.
♾️Unlimited Vendors — Track your entire stack.
🚨All New CVEs — Be the first to know.
📈EPSS Spike Alerts — Catch rising risk before it peaks.
🎯Custom EPSS/CVSS — Filter noise, focus on risk.
🛡️Exploit Intel — A 2nd confirmed-exploit signal beyond KEV.
🐙GitHub Issues — Auto-tracked, no duplicates.
📬Weekly Digest — One clean summary, not inbox spam.
🏷️Watchlist Groups — Tag alerts by team (Infra/AppSec/SOC).
💬Webhooks — Slack & Teams integration.
🔀Smart Routing — Critical alerts to one channel, rest to another.
🚫Ad-Free — Uninterrupted experience.
🎁7-Day Free Trial — Try Pro or Team, no card required.
📧Email Delivery — Threat intel straight to your inbox.
♾️Unlimited Vendors — Track your entire stack.
🚨All New CVEs — Be the first to know.
📈EPSS Spike Alerts — Catch rising risk before it peaks.
🎯Custom EPSS/CVSS — Filter noise, focus on risk.
🛡️Exploit Intel — A 2nd confirmed-exploit signal beyond KEV.
🐙GitHub Issues — Auto-tracked, no duplicates.
📬Weekly Digest — One clean summary, not inbox spam.
🏷️Watchlist Groups — Tag alerts by team (Infra/AppSec/SOC).
💬Webhooks — Slack & Teams integration.
🔀Smart Routing — Critical alerts to one channel, rest to another.
🚫Ad-Free — Uninterrupted experience.