Issue summary: OpenSSL CMS decryption sizes the key-unwrap output buffer based
on querying the unwrapped key size, but the AES-WRAP-PAD unwrap primitive
can write and cleanse more bytes than that query reports, causing an 8-byte
out-of-bounds heap write.

Impact summary: An attacker who supplies a crafted CMS message can trigger a
deterministic 8-byte out-of-bounds heap write when the victim decrypts it
with CMS_decrypt(), corrupting the heap and typically resulting in a Denial
of Service.

CWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

Description: The key-wrap OID is potentially attacker-controlled on the wire.
CMS unwrapping allows both id-aesNNN-wrap-pad and id-aesNNN-wrap ciphers.
An attacker can take a legitimate message and change a single OID byte to
select the padded variant while leaving the message otherwise valid. Since
the unwrap key is derived from the recipient's private operation (ECDH key
agreement or ML-KEM decapsulation), the RFC 5649 integrity check cannot
pass, and the decryption fails with integrity failure.

The write is a fixed-size (8-byte), fixed-value (zero) heap overflow
immediately past the allocation, requires no special configuration, and is
reachable from the public CMS_decrypt() function. The consequence is
a heap corruption leading to a Denial of Service. The fix in the CMS code
sizes the unwrap output buffer for the worst case so a failed unwrap cannot
write past the allocation.

FIPS impact: no

As the CMS code lives outside the FIPS module boundary, no FIPS
modules are affected by this CVE.