Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP response validation passed an unexpected response
sender distinguished name directly as the format string to `ERR_raise_data()`.

Impact summary: A malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint can crash a CMP client
that enforces an expected sender or uses a pinned server certificate whose
subject becomes the default expected sender.

CWE: CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)

Description: When validating a received CMP message, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update()
converts the peer-supplied sender distinguished name with X509_NAME_oneline()
and passes it directly as the format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Percent
characters survive the conversion, so a sender DN such as "CN=%s%n" reaches
BIO_vsnprintf() as an attacker-controlled format string with no matching variadic
arguments. This path is only reached when the caller configures an expected
sender or pins a server certificate, which is the normal configuration for a
CMP client validating server responses.

Since the attacker controls the format string but none of the variadic
arguments, such specifiers as %s and %n dereference or write through unrelated
stack contents and crash the client. The reliable consequence is a denial of
service, when the response comes from a malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint.
There is no controlled memory write, arbitrary-address read, or reliable path
to remote code execution.

FIPS impact: no

No FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the CMP protocol
implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.