In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing

sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology
private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a
malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the
parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.

Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete
snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size.

The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int,
but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes
negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check,
as reported in the stable review thread reference below.

Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This
rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser
dispatches to the tuple-specific code.