In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

alloc_tag: fix use-after-free in /proc/allocinfo after module unload

allocinfo_start() only reinitializes the codetag iterator at position 0.
For subsequent reads (position > 0), it reuses cached iterator state from
the previous batch. allocinfo_stop() drops mod_lock between read batches,
which allows module unload to complete and free the module memory that the
cached iterator still references:

CPU0 (read) CPU1 (rmmod)
---- ----
allocinfo_start(pos=0)
down_read(mod_lock)
allocinfo_show()
...
allocinfo_stop()
up_read(mod_lock)
codetag_unload_module()
kfree(cmod)
release_module_tags()
...
free_mod_mem()
allocinfo_start(pos=N)
down_read(mod_lock)
// reuses cached iter, skips re-init
allocinfo_show()
ct->filename <-- UAF

After free_mod_mem() frees the module's .rodata, allocinfo_show()
dereferences ct->filename, ct->function which point there.

Save the iterator state in allocinfo_next() and resume from it in
allocinfo_start() with codetag_next_ct(), which detects module removal via
idr_find() returning NULL and skips to the next module.