In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Don't move a peeked OOB message onto the pending queue

rxrpc_recvmsg_oob() takes a received oob message off recvmsg_oobq and,
if a response is needed, moves it onto the pending_oobq tree. However,
only the unlink from recvmsg_oobq is guarded by MSG_PEEK; the move onto
pending_oobq always runs.

As a result, reading a challenge with MSG_PEEK leaves the skb on
recvmsg_oobq while also adding it to pending_oobq. Since struct
sk_buff's rbnode shares storage with its next and prev pointers,
rb_insert_color() overwrites the list linkage, and the skb, which holds
a single reference, becomes reachable from both queues at once.

When the socket is closed both queues are drained in turn. While
draining recvmsg_oobq, __skb_unlink() follows the next and prev
pointers that rbnode has overwritten and writes to a bad address. Also,
as the skb holds a single reference but is freed from each queue, both
the skb and the connection reference it holds are released twice. This
leads to memory corruption and to a use-after-free caused by the
connection refcount underflow.

MSG_PEEK does not consume the message from the queue, so only unlink it
from recvmsg_oobq and then move it onto pending_oobq or free it when
the message is actually consumed.