CVE Watchtower

← Back to CVE List

CVE-2026-98273NVD

Vulnerability Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]
Severity Level
UNKNOWN
Published Date
Oct 6, 2026
Last Modified
Oct 6, 2026
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation yet
EPSS Score (30-Day)
0.17%Probability
Root Weakness (CWE)
N/A

Affected & Patched Versions

Affected Versions
Not provided by NVD for this CVE.
Patched Versions
Not provided by NVD for this CVE.
🎁7-Day Free Trial — Try Pro or Team, no card required.
📧Email Delivery — Threat intel straight to your inbox.
♾️Unlimited Vendors — Track your entire stack.
🚨All New CVEs — Be the first to know.
📈EPSS Spike Alerts — Catch rising risk before it peaks.
🎯Custom EPSS/CVSS — Filter noise, focus on risk.
🛡️Exploit Intel — A 2nd confirmed-exploit signal beyond KEV.
🐙GitHub Issues — Auto-tracked, no duplicates.
📬Weekly Digest — One clean summary, not inbox spam.
🏷️Watchlist Groups — Tag alerts by team (Infra/AppSec/SOC).
💬Webhooks — Slack & Teams integration.
🔀Smart Routing — Critical alerts to one channel, rest to another.
🚫Ad-Free — Uninterrupted experience.
🎁7-Day Free Trial — Try Pro or Team, no card required.
📧Email Delivery — Threat intel straight to your inbox.
♾️Unlimited Vendors — Track your entire stack.
🚨All New CVEs — Be the first to know.
📈EPSS Spike Alerts — Catch rising risk before it peaks.
🎯Custom EPSS/CVSS — Filter noise, focus on risk.
🛡️Exploit Intel — A 2nd confirmed-exploit signal beyond KEV.
🐙GitHub Issues — Auto-tracked, no duplicates.
📬Weekly Digest — One clean summary, not inbox spam.
🏷️Watchlist Groups — Tag alerts by team (Infra/AppSec/SOC).
💬Webhooks — Slack & Teams integration.
🔀Smart Routing — Critical alerts to one channel, rest to another.
🚫Ad-Free — Uninterrupted experience.