CVE-2026-119796<= Missing Authentication for Critical Function
NVD
Vulnerability Summary
Title: OnlyOffice callback silently skips JWT verification when the token is simply omitted, defeating the purpose of configuring `onlyoffice.jwtSecret` Affected package: `error311/FileRise` Affected version confirmed: v3.22.0 (latest release) and current `master` Component: `src/FileRise/Http/Controllers/OnlyOfficeController.php` — `trustedCallbackBody()`, `callback()` CWE: CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) / CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) Suggested severity: Medium (CVSS 3.1 estimate: `AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N` ≈ 4.5 — see scoping notes below; could be higher depending on deployment specifics the maintainer would need to confirm) --- 1. Summary FileRise integrates with ONLYOFFICE Document Server for in-browser document editing. When a document is saved, the Document Server calls back into FileRise's `OnlyOfficeController::callback()` with a JSON body describing the save (status code, a URL to fetch the saved content from, etc.). FileRise supports configuring a JWT secret (`onlyoffice.jwtSecret`) specifically so this callback body can be cryptographically verified as genuinely originating from the Document Server, per ONLYOFFICE's own documented security model. Tracing the verification path shows that presenting no JWT at all causes the body to be trusted anyway, rather than rejected — the exact opposite of fail-closed behavior expected from an optional-but-configured authentication mechanism. 2. Root Cause ```php private function trustedCallbackBody(array $rawBody, string $secret): ?array { $jwt = $this->callbackJwtTokenFromRequest($rawBody); if ($jwt === '') { return $rawBody; // <-- no JWT present: body is trusted as-is, unverified } $payload = $this->decodeJwtPayload($jwt, $secret); if (!is_array($payload)) { return null; } ... } ``` In `callback()`, this is called as: ```php $body = $this->trustedCallbackBody($rawBody, $secret); ... if ($jwt === '') { $this->ooLog('warn', "callback JWT missing; falling back to signed callback token only for $folder/$file"); } $status = (int)($body['status'] ?? 0); ... if (in_array($status, [2,6,7], true)) { ... $saveUrl = (string)($body['url'] ?? ''); ... if (!$this->isAllowedOnlyOfficeUrl($saveUrl)) { ... } // fetches $saveUrl via curl and writes the result as the new file content } ``` The only thing standing between an attacker and controlling `status`/`url` is a separate, outer signed token (`tok` query parameter, HMAC-verified via `decodeSignedPayloadToken`) that encodes `folder`, `file`, `actor`, `edit`, `op`, and an expiry. That token is correctly verified and does gate the request to a specific document/session — but it says nothing about the content of the POST body, which is exactly what the inner JWT check exists to authenticate. By making the inner check a no-op whenever the caller simply doesn't send a token, the code lets anyone who has obtained (or reconstructed) a valid `tok` value dictate the `status` and `url` fields themselves, rather than requiring those fields to have actually come from the Document Server. 3. Why this matters even with the outer `tok` check - The outer `tok` is generated by FileRise and handed to the Document Server as part of the editing session/callback configuration. In practice this value is visible client-side (e.g. via browser devtools network inspection) to any user who has been granted edit access to open the document in the ONLYOFFICE editor — it is not a server-to-server-only secret. - Once a user with edit access captures a `tok` for a document they're allowed to edit, they can call the callback endpoint directly, bypassing the Document Server and the ONLYOFFICE-side JWT entirely, and supply an arbitrary `status`/`url` body of their own choosing. - `isAllowedOnlyOfficeUrl()` restricts the accepted save URL to the same scheme/host/port as the configured Document Server origin — it does not verify the URL corresponds to the actual save artifact for that specific editing session. So the practical severity depends on whether an attacker can get arbitrary content hosted at some URL on that same origin (e.g., another document they also have access to render/host on the Document Server, or any endpoint on that host that echoes attacker-supplied content). I want to flag this honestly: I have not demonstrated an end-to-end content-hosting trick on a real Document Server instance, so I'm presenting this as a verified logic/authentication gap with a plausible but unconfirmed path to full impact, not a demonstrated arbitrary-content-injection PoC. 4. Recommended Fix - Require the inner JWT whenever `onlyoffice.jwtSecret` is configured (i.e., whenever `effectiveSecret() !== ''`), and reject the callback outright if no token is present — the same way the code already rejects it when a token is present but invalid. The current code path only rejects on invalid token, not absent token, which is the actual gap. - Do not treat `$jwt === ''` as a graceful degradation path ("falling back to signed callback token only") — log it as a rejection, not a warning-and-continue. - Consider additionally binding the `url` field to the specific session (e.g., a value derived from the same `tok` payload) rather than relying purely on origin matching, so that even a same-origin URL can't be substituted for a different document's save artifact. 5. Suggested Disclosure Text > Title: OnlyOffice callback accepts unsigned request body when the JWT token is omitted, bypassing the purpose of `onlyoffice.jwtSecret` > Component: `src/FileRise/Http/Controllers/OnlyOfficeController.php::trustedCallbackBody()` / `::callback()` > Affected versions: ≤3.22.0 (current release) > Class: CWE-306 / CWE-345 > When `onlyoffice.jwtSecret` is configured, `trustedCallbackBody()` still returns the raw, unverified request body if the caller simply omits the JWT (no `token` field, no `Authorization: Bearer` header) instead of rejecting the callback. Only a separate, client-visible signed session token (`tok` query parameter) gates the request; it authenticates the session but not the body's `status`/`url` fields, which is what the JWT is meant to protect. Recommend rejecting callbacks with a missing token exactly as invalid-token callbacks are already rejected, whenever a JWT secret is configured. --- Independently identified via source review of `src/FileRise/Http/Controllers/OnlyOfficeController.php` on the current v3.22.0 release. Distinct from the previously published CVE-2026-33070/33071/33072 and GHSA-46gv/GHSA-vh5m advisories for this project, which concern the share-link and WebDAV-upload subsystems. Not previously published as a CVE or GitHub Security Advisory as of this writing. Practical end-to-end exploitability (getting attacker-controlled content hosted at an allowed URL) was not demonstrated and should be verified by the maintainer. Maintainer Assessment Thank you for the responsible disclosure and careful distinction between the verified logic issue and the deployment-dependent impact. We confirmed the callback-authentication gap. FileRise required a separate, signed callback URL token bound to the authorized actor, file, source, edit operation, and expiration. It also rejected a supplied invalid ONLYOFFICE JWT. However, when the callback JWT was omitted completely, FileRise accepted the unsigned request body after validating only the outer callback token. This preserved compatibility with Document Servers that did not emit outgoing JWTs, but it did not provide the body authenticity expected when a shared JWT secret was configured. The fix is included in FileRise v3.23.0: - Missing callback JWTs are rejected by default. - HS256 callback JWTs continue to be accepted from the request body or `Authorization: Bearer` header. - Invalid, malformed, wrong-algorithm, and wrong-secret tokens fail closed. - The JWT-authenticated payload, rather than unsigned duplicate request fields, controls callback status and save URL processing. - The existing signed callback URL token, actor/file binding, current ACL check, short expiration, and same-origin save URL restriction remain in place as independent protections. - The Admin Panel reports whether strict callback JWT enforcement is active and warns when compatibility mode is enabled. - Migration documentation now explains the required ONLYOFFICE outgoing/outbox JWT configuration. - An explicitly unsafe deployment-only override, `ONLYOFFICE_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_CALLBACKS=1`, is available for temporary recovery of an older misconfigured Document Server. It is disabled by default and does not permit a supplied invalid JWT. Existing documents and FileRise storage require no migration. Deployments whose Document Server already has outgoing JWTs enabled with the same secret continue normally. A server that omits outgoing JWTs must be corrected before saves can complete under the secure default. CWE-306 is not the most precise primary classification because the critical callback was not unauthenticated: it still required FileRise's valid, file-specific callback token and a currently authorized editor. CWE-345 directly describes the missing authenticity verification for the body fields. Please verify the remediation against FileRise v3.23.0 before publication. We can request a CVE through this GitHub security advisory after the release information is finalized.
CVSS v3.1 Base Metrics — Score 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NAttack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityHigh
Privileges RequiredLow
User InteractionNone
ScopeUnchanged
ConfidentialityNone
IntegrityLow
AvailabilityNone
Affected & Patched Versions
- <= 3.22.0
- 3.23.0
What to do
Fix it during your normal patch cycle. No exploitation is confirmed yet.
- Check whether you run <= and which version.
- Update to a patched version listed above, then confirm the new version.
Timeline
- Aug 2, 2026Published
- Aug 2, 2026Record last modified
Score, severity and exploitation changes are tracked from the day Watchtower started logging them.
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External References
Data last checked: Nov 21, 2026 20:00 UTC