CVE-2026-41583zebrad
NVD
Vulnerability Summary
# CVE-2026-41583: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling
## Summary
After a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes.
In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split.
## Severity
**Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.
Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`.
## Affected Versions
All Zebra versions prior to version 4.3.1. (Some older versions are not impacted but are no longer supported by the network.)
## Description
Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code was called from Zebra through foreign function interface (FFI). That interface was clunky because it required parsing the whole transaction in C++ code, which would then pull Rust libraries which could get in conflict with Zebra code. A refactoring was done so that only the verification itself was done in C++, and the rest done by Rust code, using a callback. However, in this refactoring, it was not noticed that a particular consensus rule - only accepting known hash types in transparent transaction signatures - was being enforced in C++ code and thus had to be enforced by the Rust caller.
An attacker could exploit this by:
- Submitting a V4 or V5 transaction with an invalid hash type
- The V5 transaction would be accepted by Zebra nodes but not by `zcashd` nodes (and vice-versa for V4), creating a consensus split in the network.
## Impact
**Consensus Failure**
- **Attack Vector:** Network.
- **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split.
- **Scope:** Any Zebra affected Zebra node
## Fixed Versions
This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.3.1.
The fix adds the consensus check in the caller of the C++ verification code. It also uses the raw hash type for V4 sighash computations.
## Mitigation
Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.3.1 or later immediately.
There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.
## Credits
Thanks Alex “Scalar” Sol for finding and reporting the issue, and to @sangsoo-osec who independently found the same issue and demonstrated that the V4 variant was also exploitable.
## Summary
After a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes.
In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split.
## Severity
**Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.
Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`.
## Affected Versions
All Zebra versions prior to version 4.3.1. (Some older versions are not impacted but are no longer supported by the network.)
## Description
Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code was called from Zebra through foreign function interface (FFI). That interface was clunky because it required parsing the whole transaction in C++ code, which would then pull Rust libraries which could get in conflict with Zebra code. A refactoring was done so that only the verification itself was done in C++, and the rest done by Rust code, using a callback. However, in this refactoring, it was not noticed that a particular consensus rule - only accepting known hash types in transparent transaction signatures - was being enforced in C++ code and thus had to be enforced by the Rust caller.
An attacker could exploit this by:
- Submitting a V4 or V5 transaction with an invalid hash type
- The V5 transaction would be accepted by Zebra nodes but not by `zcashd` nodes (and vice-versa for V4), creating a consensus split in the network.
## Impact
**Consensus Failure**
- **Attack Vector:** Network.
- **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split.
- **Scope:** Any Zebra affected Zebra node
## Fixed Versions
This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.3.1.
The fix adds the consensus check in the caller of the C++ verification code. It also uses the raw hash type for V4 sighash computations.
## Mitigation
Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.3.1 or later immediately.
There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.
## Credits
Thanks Alex “Scalar” Sol for finding and reporting the issue, and to @sangsoo-osec who independently found the same issue and demonstrated that the V4 variant was also exploitable.
CVSS v4.0 Base Metrics — Score 9.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:HAttack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Attack RequirementsNone
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
Confidentiality (Vulnerable System)None
Integrity (Vulnerable System)High
Availability (Vulnerable System)High
Confidentiality (Subsequent System)None
Integrity (Subsequent System)High
Availability (Subsequent System)High
Show CVSS v3.x metrics (score 9.1)
CVSS v3.1 Base Metrics — Score 9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HAttack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
ScopeUnchanged
ConfidentialityNone
IntegrityHigh
AvailabilityHigh
Affected & Patched Versions
- zebrad < 4.3.1
- zebra-script < 5.0.2
No patched version published yet
Until a fix ships, reduce exposure:
- Restrict access to the affected service or interface to trusted networks.
- Disable the affected feature if you do not need it.
- Watch the vendor advisory for a firmware or software update.
What to do
Plan remediation soon. No exploitation is confirmed yet, but the severity is critical.
- Check whether you run zebrad and which version.
- No patched version is listed yet. Limit access to the affected service to trusted networks, and disable the feature if you can.
- Subscribe to the vendor advisory so you learn when a fix ships.
Timeline
- Apr 18, 2026Published
- Nov 17, 2026Record last modified
Score, severity and exploitation changes are tracked from the day Watchtower started logging them.
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External References
- Vendor Advisoryhttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj
- Patchhttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1f605eca5c55e3b65229fa01a97d9aa84fd37447
- CVE Recordhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41583
- Referencehttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj
Data last checked: Sep 23, 2026 13:58 UTC