The WPML Multilingual CMS plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Race Condition in versions up to, and including, 4.9.7. This is due to the `process_iframe_request` function's language-per-domain SSO handler generating the cross-domain sign-in token via `wp_create_nonce('wpml_sso')` on the logout landing page, where the browser has already discarded its authentication cookies — so `wp_get_session_token()` returns an empty string and the token collapses to the shared anonymous nonce for the current 12-hour tick rather than a user-bound secret — and then storing it in the `wpml_sso_user_<token>_<sha256('wpml_sso'.$domain)>` transient mapped to the victim's `user_id` with no binding to the specific sign-out action or requesting client. Because an unauthenticated attacker can independently derive the identical token by triggering the logout confirmation flow on `wp-login.php?action=logout`, and because the `is_iframe_request()` gate conditions (the per-domain SSO `started` transient and domain-hash derived from the public constant `SSO_NONCE`) are fully computable within the 60-second `SSO_TIMEOUT` window, an unauthenticated attacker can submit the forged `wpml_sso_token_domain` parameter with a `wpml_user_signed_in` status to a secondary language-domain endpoint before the legitimate `wpml_user_signed_out` iframe fires, causing WordPress authentication cookies to be issued for the victim. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain access to accounts of users — including administrators — who are actively in the process of logging out during the race window.