CVE-2026-90585Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (Infinite Loop)
NVDCVSS scored by vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org
Vulnerability Summary
The Renesas RA SCI UART driver's receive-error ISR, uart_ra_sci_eri_isr() in drivers/serial/uart_renesas_ra_sci.c, acknowledged the error condition only when a Zephyr interrupt-driven callback had already been registered. With CONFIG_UART_INTERRUPT_DRIVEN=y and CONFIG_UART_ASYNC_API=n, if data->user_cb is NULL the ISR body is empty: the SCI error flags (SSR.ORER, SSR.FER, SSR.PER) are left set and the ICU event flag R_ICU->IELSR_b[eri_irq].IR is never cleared, so the interrupt re-pends immediately and the ISR is re-entered without end.
The error interrupt is masked at boot by uart_ra_sci_init(), but FSP's R_SCI_UART_Open() unconditionally re-enables it, and uart_ra_sci_configure() - the back end of the public uart_configure() API, enabled by default via CONFIG_UART_USE_RUNTIME_CONFIGURE - performs a Close()/Open() pair without re-masking it. Any runtime uart_configure() therefore leaves the error interrupt live regardless of whether a callback has been set, as does calling uart_irq_err_enable() on its own. An instance used with the polling API, or the window between uart_configure() and uart_irq_callback_user_data_set(), thus runs with the error interrupt unmasked and no callback registered.
The trigger is an ordinary receive line error - overrun, framing, parity, or a break condition - which is fully determined by the device attached to the serial link. A peer able to assert a break or transmit at a mismatched baud rate produces such an error at will, so a single frame is enough to enter the state.
The impact is availability only: the CPU is captured in the re-entering ISR and never returns to thread context, hanging the entire system until an external reset or hardware watchdog fires. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure. Builds using the asynchronous UART API are unaffected, because the fall-through to FSP's sci_uart_eri_isr() clears both the error flags and the pending IRQ.
The error interrupt is masked at boot by uart_ra_sci_init(), but FSP's R_SCI_UART_Open() unconditionally re-enables it, and uart_ra_sci_configure() - the back end of the public uart_configure() API, enabled by default via CONFIG_UART_USE_RUNTIME_CONFIGURE - performs a Close()/Open() pair without re-masking it. Any runtime uart_configure() therefore leaves the error interrupt live regardless of whether a callback has been set, as does calling uart_irq_err_enable() on its own. An instance used with the polling API, or the window between uart_configure() and uart_irq_callback_user_data_set(), thus runs with the error interrupt unmasked and no callback registered.
The trigger is an ordinary receive line error - overrun, framing, parity, or a break condition - which is fully determined by the device attached to the serial link. A peer able to assert a break or transmit at a mismatched baud rate produces such an error at will, so a single frame is enough to enter the state.
The impact is availability only: the CPU is captured in the re-entering ISR and never returns to thread context, hanging the entire system until an external reset or hardware watchdog fires. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure. Builds using the asynchronous UART API are unaffected, because the fall-through to FSP's sci_uart_eri_isr() clears both the error flags and the pending IRQ.
CVSS v3.1 Base Metrics — Score 4.6 (MEDIUM)
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HAttack VectorPhysical
Attack ComplexityLow
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
ScopeUnchanged
ConfidentialityNone
IntegrityNone
AvailabilityHigh
Affected & Patched Versions
Not provided by NVD for this CVE.
No patched version published yet
Until a fix ships, reduce exposure:
- Restrict access to the affected service or interface to trusted networks.
- Disable the affected feature if you do not need it.
- Watch the vendor advisory for a firmware or software update.
What to do
Fix it during your normal patch cycle. No exploitation is confirmed yet.
- Check whether you run the affected product and which version.
- No patched version is listed yet. Limit access to the affected service to trusted networks, and disable the feature if you can.
- Subscribe to the vendor advisory so you learn when a fix ships.
Timeline
- Nov 9, 2026Published
- Nov 12, 2026Record last modified
Score, severity and exploitation changes are tracked from the day Watchtower started logging them.
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Data last checked: Nov 9, 2026 23:01 UTC