In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read

rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo->addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.

In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo->addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:

if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) {
i++;
}
if (i == rtinfo->addrnr)
break;

When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo->addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo->addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.

If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.

Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
rtinfo->addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i < rtinfo->addrnr)
into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
at the end of the loop body.