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CVE-2026-47212NVD
Vulnerability Summary
### Description
The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.
As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.
### Resolution
`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.
When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.
Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed.
The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/8545fb2af6c07dfb5ef0fc8d9bccf86db2c94356) for branch 6.4.
### Credits
Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.
As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.
### Resolution
`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.
When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.
Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed.
The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/8545fb2af6c07dfb5ef0fc8d9bccf86db2c94356) for branch 6.4.
### Credits
Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.