## Summary

The `/api/settings/database` endpoint allows full database export (containing all credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, and settings) and full database import (complete overwrite) without any authentication requirement beyond the `ALWAYS_PROTECTED` middleware check, which only validates JWT or CLI token. Combined with other vulnerabilities (e.g., default password, tunnel exposure), this enables complete database takeover.

## Description

The endpoint `/api/settings/database` is listed in `ALWAYS_PROTECTED` in `dashboardGuard.js` (line 42), which requires a valid JWT token or CLI token. However, this protection is insufficient because:

1. **GET (Export):** Returns the complete database including API keys (`key` field in `apiKeys` table), OAuth tokens, and all provider credentials. Line 80 in `src/lib/db/index.js`: `apiKeys: db.all("SELECT * FROM apiKeys").map(...)` — the `key` field contains the plaintext API key value.

2. **POST (Import):** Accepts arbitrary JSON and performs a complete database wipe-and-replace in a transaction (lines 102-163 in `src/lib/db/index.js`). This replaces all settings including the password hash, effectively allowing an attacker to set their own password.

3. The exported data includes `apiKeys` with their plaintext `key` values, `providerConnections` with all OAuth tokens, and `settings` with OIDC client secrets.

### Evidence

**File:** `src/app/api/settings/database/route.js`
```javascript
export async function GET() {
const payload = await exportDb();
return NextResponse.json(payload);
}

export async function POST(request) {
const payload = await request.json();
await importDb(payload);
// ...
}
```

**File:** `src/lib/db/index.js` (lines 96-163)
```javascript
export async function importDb(payload) {
db.transaction(() => {
// Wipe all tables
db.run(`DELETE FROM settings`);
db.run(`DELETE FROM providerConnections`);
db.run(`DELETE FROM providerNodes`);
db.run(`DELETE FROM proxyPools`);
db.run(`DELETE FROM apiKeys`);
db.run(`DELETE FROM combos`);
db.run(`DELETE FROM kv WHERE scope IN (...)`);
// Then insert attacker-controlled data
// ...
});
}
```

The `exportDb` function at line 80 exposes API key plaintext:
```javascript
apiKeys: db.all(`SELECT * FROM apiKeys`).map((r) => ({
id: r.id, key: r.key, name: r.name, ...
})),
```

## Steps to Reproduce

1. Authenticate with any valid JWT (e.g., using the default password "123456")
2. Export: `curl -b auth_token=<jwt> http://localhost:20128/api/settings/database`
3. Observe: Full database dump with all credentials in plaintext
4. Import malicious data: `curl -X POST -b auth_token=<jwt> -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '<modified-db>' http://localhost:20128/api/settings/database`
5. All settings, passwords, API keys are now replaced with attacker-controlled values

## Impact

- **Confidentiality:** Complete exposure of all stored secrets (API keys, OAuth tokens, OIDC client secrets)
- **Integrity:** Complete database replacement with attacker-controlled data
- **Availability:** Database wipe is possible by importing an empty database
- **Scope Changed:** Importing new settings affects all users and downstream services

## Recommended Fix

1. Require re-authentication for database export/import (not just an existing session)
2. Mask/redact API keys in export (or require explicit opt-in for key export)
3. Add confirmation step for import (require current password verification)
4. Implement database backup before import
5. Log all export/import operations with audit trail