Insulin pumps, infusion systems, imaging equipment, cardiac monitors and wearable sensors increasingly run complex software and connect to hospital networks, smartphones and the cloud. That connectivity improves care, but it also turns medical devices into potential entry points for attackers. Unlike a compromised laptop, a compromised medical device can directly affect patient safety.
For manufacturers, cybersecurity has moved from a nice-to-have to a regulatory requirement and a core engineering discipline. This article explains why, what the threat landscape looks like, and how device makers are building security into products from the start.
Why Medical Devices Are Attractive Targets
Medical devices combine several characteristics that make them appealing to attackers. Many have long service lives, sometimes a decade or more, which means they may run outdated operating systems and libraries. They often sit on hospital networks alongside sensitive clinical systems. Some cannot be patched quickly because changes may require validation and regulatory review. And their failure can have physical consequences, which raises the stakes for hospitals hit by ransomware or disruption.
Common weaknesses include hard-coded or default credentials, unencrypted communications, outdated third-party components with known vulnerabilities, exposed debug interfaces and insecure update mechanisms.
From Afterthought to Requirement
For years, device security was often addressed late in development, if at all. That has changed. In the US, Section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act now sets cybersecurity requirements for “cyber devices” in premarket submissions, including plans to monitor and address postmarket vulnerabilities, processes to provide reasonable assurance that devices are secure, and a software bill of materials. Regulators in other major markets have also strengthened their expectations.
The practical result is that cybersecurity documentation now sits alongside safety and performance evidence in regulatory submissions, and weaknesses can delay market access.
Building Security Into the Device Lifecycle
The most effective manufacturers treat security as part of the total product lifecycle rather than a final test.
Threat Modeling
Early in design, teams map how the device and its connected systems could be attacked, what assets need protection and which threats could affect safety or effectiveness.
Security Risk Management
Security risks are assessed and controlled in a way that connects to the device’s broader safety risk management, since a security failure can become a safety hazard.
Secure Architecture
Controls such as authentication, encryption, code signing, secure boot and the principle of least privilege are designed in rather than bolted on.
Testing
Vulnerability scanning, fuzz testing, static and dynamic analysis and penetration testing provide evidence that controls work as intended.
Transparency and Postmarket Monitoring
A software bill of materials, coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes and a plan for timely updates keep devices secure after launch.
For manufacturers trying to understand how these pieces fit together across design, testing and regulatory documentation, resources such as bluegoatcyber.com/medical-device-cybersecurity outline the main elements of a medical device cybersecurity program and how they support premarket submissions.
What Regulators Expect to See
The FDA’s guidance on cybersecurity in medical devices and the content of premarket submissions describes the agency’s recommendations for security design, labeling and documentation, including how manufacturers should address Section 524B for cyber devices. It emphasizes a secure product development framework, threat modeling, security risk management, architecture views, testing evidence and a software bill of materials.
Manufacturers that align their development process with this guidance early tend to find submissions smoother than those that try to assemble evidence at the end.
The Role of Hospitals and Healthcare Delivery Organizations
Manufacturers are not the only ones responsible. Hospitals need accurate asset inventories, network segmentation for medical devices, procedures for applying vendor patches and clear communication channels with manufacturers. Procurement teams increasingly ask vendors for security documentation and SBOMs before buying, which gives device makers another reason to invest in security.
Practical Steps for Device Makers
For teams starting or maturing a device security program, a few priorities stand out:
- Establish a secure product development framework and integrate it into the quality system.
- Begin threat modeling during early design, not after verification.
- Maintain an accurate, machine-readable SBOM and monitor components for vulnerabilities.
- Plan independent security testing, including penetration testing, at appropriate stages.
- Set up a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process before launch.
- Document decisions and evidence in a way that maps clearly to regulatory expectations.
Security as Part of Patient Safety
Medical device cybersecurity is now inseparable from patient safety and regulatory success. Connected devices face real threats, regulators expect evidence of security across the lifecycle, and hospitals increasingly demand transparency from suppliers. Manufacturers that design security in from the start, test it rigorously and keep monitoring after launch will protect patients and bring products to market with fewer surprises.