The Genians Security Center (GSC) has uncovered a new phase in the KONNI APT campaign, revealing a state-sponsored cyberespionage operation that leverages Googleβs Find Hub feature to remotely wipe and track Android devices belonging to South Korean victims. The campaign is attributed to actors associated with North Koreaβs Kimsuky and APT37 groups, both linked to the regimeβs 63 Research Center.
βThe recently identified KONNI campaign is particularly notable for cases in which Google Androidβbased smartphones and tablet PCs in South Korea were remotely reset, resulting in the unauthorized deletion of personal data stored on the devices,β GSC stated. βThis is the first confirmed case in which a state-sponsored threat actor obtained remote control by compromising Google accounts, then used the service to perform location tracking and remote wipe.β
The attack began with spear-phishing and social engineering campaigns targeting psychological counselors and North Korean human rights activists, posing as trusted acquaintances or government officials. The attackers distributed malware disguised as a βstress-relief programβ via KakaoTalk Messenger, a widely used communication app in South Korea.

βAttackers impersonated psychological counselors and North Korean human rights activists, distributing malware disguised as stress-relief programs,β the GSC report noted. βMalicious files were delivered through the KakaoTalk messenger, leveraging impersonation of acquaintances to conduct trust-based attacks.β
One of the victims, a psychological counselor assisting North Korean defectors, received a file titled βStress Clear.msiβ. Once executed, the installer appeared to display a language error but silently deployed malicious scripts designed to maintain persistence, exfiltrate data, and monitor user activity.
The attackersβ tactics reflected a high level of psychological and social engineering sophistication. After compromising a victimβs PC, they used the victimβs KakaoTalk account to propagate the same malware to contacts, amplifying the infection chain.
βThis campaign is assessed as a typical social-engineering attack that leveraged trust-based communications to precisely exploit the targetβs psychological and social context,β GSC said. βThe compromise of messenger accounts and their use as a secondary attack vector increased the attackβs level of customization while expanding its attack surface.β
Notably, the attackers timed their remote actions to coincide with the victimsβ absence, using Googleβs Find Hub to confirm when a victim was physically away before triggering a remote factory reset of Android devices β effectively cutting off communications and delaying incident response.
βImmediately after confirming through Find Hubβs location query that the victim was outside, the threat actor executed a remote reset command on the victimβs Android devices,β GSC detailed. βThis combination of device neutralization and account-based propagation is unprecedented among previously known state-sponsored APT scenarios.β
The KONNI operators gained access to victimsβ Google accounts and exploited Find Hub, a legitimate Android management service used to locate lost devices, to perform malicious remote resets and data destruction.
βUsing the stolen credentials, the attacker took control of the accounts and misused Find Hubβs management features to execute destructive actions, such as remotely wiping mobile devices,β the report explained. βEven after the device reset was completed, the threat actor repeatedly sent the same remote reset command more than three times, disrupting and delaying the normal recovery and use of the targeted smart devices for an extended period, which rendered the affected devices unavailable for normal use.β
By deleting Gmail security alerts and clearing account activity logs, the attackers ensured stealth and persistence. This abuse of a built-in Google feature represents an alarming new technique in APT toolkits, weaponizing trusted cloud services against users themselves.
The core payload distributed via KakaoTalk was a malicious MSI installer β Stress Clear.msi β digitally signed under a Chinese entity (Chengdu Hechenyingjia Mining Partnership Enterprise) to bypass trust checks. The installer deployed an AutoIt-based script designed for persistence, surveillance, and remote access.
βThe MSI contains a valid digital signature issued to “Chengdu Hechenyingjia Mining Partnership Enterprise” in China. This represents an abuse of code signing: the attacker used a legitimate-looking signature to disguise the fileβs origin and integrity, making it appear like a legitimate application,β GSC wrote.
The AutoIt script (IoKlTr.au3) deployed on the victimβs system mimicked legitimate Windows tasks, registered a scheduled job to execute every minute, and connected to Germany-based WordPress C2 infrastructure β bp-analytics[.]de β to fetch remote payloads.
ENKI identified multiple RATs embedded in the infection chain, including RemcosRAT, QuasarRAT, and RftRAT, which provided remote control, keylogging, webcam activation, and command execution capabilities. Each RAT was encrypted using AES and embedded within obfuscated AutoIt scripts to evade detection.
βAnalysis shows that these files contain malicious AutoIt scripts and modules that enable remote access and keylogging,β the report confirmed. βThe threat actor concealed various malware components by encoding or encrypting them within AutoIt scripts. This technique is assessed as a strategy to evade security product detection and delay analysis of malicious activity.β
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